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TAXPAYER CHOICE IN LEGAL TRANSITIONS
Heather M Field
Tax rules change frequently, and each change raises the question of
how to deal appropriately with the winners and losers created by the
change. Scholars have long discussed this issue of transitionpolicy. The
rich literature on tax transition policy, however, implicitly assumes that
Congress or, in the case of regulations, the Treasury Department, and not
the individual taxpayers who are affected by the change, will ultimately
determine when the new law will become applicable to all taxpayers. This is
not necessarily the case. Many tax law transition provisions include
transitionalelections, which cede to the affected taxpayers the authority to
choose whether the old laws or the new laws will apply to them during a
transition period. This deference to the choices of individual taxpayers
merits special attention because tax elections reduce revenue and can
increase complexity, and because the policy benefits of a law change can be
enhanced or stunted by the manner in which the change is implemented
This attention has been lacking until now. To fill this gap in the literature,
this article explains how transitionalelections are used in the tax law and
analyzes when, if ever, transitionalelections should be used as part of tax
transitionpolicy. Ultimately, this article aims to help policymakers make
informed decisions about whether and when taxpayers should be
empowered to make individual choices about the implementation of
changes in the tax law.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Tax rules change frequently. New tax bills are enacted into law, and
new regulations are promulgated. It is widely accepted that these changes
create winners and losers. 2 Consider the oft-discussed example of the
immediate repeal of the tax exemption for interest paid on municipal

2 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 181 (1977)
[hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]; DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 26 (2000).
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bonds. 3 Taxpayers who hold the bonds at the time of the law change will
generally see their after-tax return on the bonds decline, and municipalities
raising money after the law change may face more expensive borrowing
costs; 4 they lose as a result of this change in the law. At the same time,
holders of taxable bonds or other investment assets that may have
previously competed with municipal bonds for investment dollars may
experience price increases, and subsequent issuers of those competing
assets may face less expensive borrowing costs due to increased demand for
those assets; 5 they are the winners as a result of this change in the law.
Each change in the tax law raises the question of how to deal
appropriately with these winners and losers when replacing old rules with
They
new rules. Scholars have long discussed this issue of transition policy.
S6
argue about whether new laws should be nominally retroactive, and they
debate the merits of providing transition relief such as grandfather
provisions,7 phased-in effective dates, 8 or delayed effective dates 9 in order
3 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income
Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 53-57 (1977) [hereinafter Graetz, Legal Transitions]
(using the repeal of the tax exemption for municipal bond interest as an example to illustrate
the impact of potential transition rules); see also Eric Chason, The Economic Ambiguity (and
PossibleIrrelevance) of Tax TransitionRules, 22 VA. TAX REv. 615, 626-37 (2003) (same).
4 See Michael Doran, Legislative Compromise and Tax Transition Policy, 74 U. CHI.
L. REv. 545, 548-51 (2007). Note that the after-tax return on the municipal bonds might
decline even in the presence of mandatory transition relief, particularly if the transition relief
is a phased-in effective date or delayed effective date rather than a grandfather clause. See
Graetz, Legal Transitions,supra note 3, at 57-63.
5 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv.
509, 552-53 (1986) [hereinafter Kaplow, Economic Analysis].
6 See, e.g.. Comm. on Tax Policy, Tax Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Retroactivity of
Tax Legislation, 29 TAX LAW. 21, 28 (1975); Graetz, Legal Transitions,supra note 3, at 49,
59-60; Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STuD. 265 (1993)
[hereinafter Levmore, Retroactive Taxation]; Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax
Legislation: A Rule of Prospectivity, 84 HARv. L. REv. 436, 437-46 (1970). The term
"nominally retroactive" is used to describe any tax law that has an effective date that is prior
to the date of enactment of the tax law. Thus, nominally retroactive tax law changes are
distinguished from tax law changes that have effective dates on or after the date of
enactment (i.e., tax laws that are "nominally prospective"). However, even nominally
prospective tax changes can implicitly affect the value and economic consequences of
actions taken before the date of enactment; thus, a nominally prospective change may have
retrospective impact even though it is not, by its terms, applicable to events occurring before
enactment. See Graetz, Legal Transitions,supra note 3, at 49-52 (defining retroactivity); see
also Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of Retroactivity, 51 ALA. L. REv.
1329, 1332-39 (2000) (distinguishing retroactivity from retrospectivity).
7 Grandfather provisions generally provide that the new rule will not apply to
transactions entered into prior to the date of enactment of the new law or to assets held prior
to the date of enactment of the new rule. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 53.
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to ease the shift over to the new rule.' 0 This literature acknowledges that
taxpayers often have input into the substance, timing, and impact of rule
changes. For example, taxpayers can vote for elected officials, lobby their
representatives, submit comments regarding proposed regulations, and alter
their individual behavior in light of an anticipated or upcoming change in
the law. However, despite the role that taxpayers may play in the process of
changing the law, the extensive literature on tax transition policy seems to
implicitly assume that Congress or the Treasury Department ("Treasury"),
and not the individual taxpayers who are affected by the change, will
ultimately determine when the new law will become applicable to all
taxpayers.
This is not necessarily the case. Many tax law transition provisions
include transitional elections, which cede to the affected taxpayers the
authority to choose whether the old laws or the new laws will apply to them
during a transition period.' 1 Transitional elections are explicit elections,
whereby a taxpayer can opt to have the old rule apply or to have the new
rule apply, just by "tell[ing] the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or
"Service") how he wishes to be treated for tax purposes" and without
otherwise altering his economic or legal affairs. 12 Despite the use of

8 Phased-in effective dates generally provide that a new rule "is made effective

gradually, for example, one-third in the year after enactment and one-third in each of the two
subsequent years." Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 52.
9 Delayed effective dates generally provide that a new rule "is made effective only
after the passage of some time, for example, five years from the date of enactment." Graetz,
Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 52.

10

See, e.g., BLUEPRINTS, supra note 2, at 189-91 (recommending

the use of
grandfather provisions and phased-in effective dates); Chason, supra note 3, at 644
(providing tepid support for grandfather provisions); Graetz, Legal Transitions,supra note 3,
at 87 (arguing the use of grandfather provisions should be disfavored); see also infra Part II
(providing a brief overview of the debate in the literature regarding transition policy).
II See infra Part III (providing examples of transitional elections).
12 Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the
Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 22 (2010). Explicit elections are
distinguished from implicit (or de facto) elections where a taxpayer can self-help by
"arrang[ing] his economic and/or legal affairs so as to qualify for his desired tax treatment."
Id. For an example of an implicit choice available in the transition context, assume that a
new law has a delayed effective date and will become effective as of January I' of next year.
A taxpayer can try to accelerate the transaction so that it is completed this year, in which
case the old law would apply to the transaction. Alternatively, the taxpayer can delay the
transaction until next year in order to choose to have the new law apply. See infra Part IV.C.
(discussing this type of taxpayer reaction to changes in the law). The availability of taxpayer
choice in legal transitions, however, goes beyond these opportunities for tax planning. As
discussed herein, sometimes Congress uses transitional elections to explicitly delegate to
individual taxpayers the task of deciding when the new law will begin to apply to them. If
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transitional elections 13 in the Internal Revenue Code 14 ("Code") and
Treasury Regulations ("Regulations"), the tax transition literature generally
does not specifically discuss these elections, 15 perhaps lumping transitional
elections together with general transition relief. 16 Transitional elections
differ from general transition relief, however, because transitional elections
explicitly contemplate empowering individual taxpayers to decide whether
and when they will begin to be affected by the law change. Other types of
transition relief do not. The legislative and regulatory deference to the
choices of individual taxpayers merits special attention because tax
elections reduce revenue and can increase complexity. 17 Moreover, the
policy benefits of a law change can be enhanced or stunted by the manner in
which the change is implemented.
To help fill this gap in the literature, this paper explains how
transitional elections are used in the tax law and analyzes when, if ever,
transitional elections should be used as part of tax transition policy. Part II
of this paper provides a brief overview of the tax transition literature, and
Part III draws on examples of transitional elections in order to demonstrate
how they are used in the tax law. Part IV evaluates the policy implications
of using transitional elections. Specifically, Part IV examines (i) the ability
of transitional elections to accommodate taxpayer expectations about
changes in the law, (ii) the extent to which transitional elections can help
mitigate public choice concerns about the legislative process, (iii) the
information revealing and neutrality enhancing functions that individual
choice may serve in the context of tax transitions, and (iv) the impact of
transitional elections on revenue and on the complexity and administrability
of the tax system. Part V concludes by providing some insight into the
situations in which transitional elections may be particularly useful.
Ultimately, this Article argues that although transitional elections are far
from an ideal approach to transition policy, they may be valuable on a casethere is an explicit transitional election, the taxpayer, subject to some limitations, can just
choose whether the new law or the old law applies, without changing the timing of the
transaction.
13 Examples are discussed in Part III, infra.
14 Unless otherwise stated, all "section" references and references to the Code herein
refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
15 Even the few scholars who study elections only discuss transitional elections briefly.
See MICHAEL B. LANG & COLLEEN A. KHOURY, FEDERAL TAX ELECTIONS

1.03[4] (1996).

16 Those who argue for or against the use of a particular type of transition relief could

implicitly be considering both mandatory and elective relief. For example, a scholar who
argues against the use of grandfather clauses in general would surely also object to allowing
grandfather protection at the taxpayer's option.
17 See Field, supra note 12, at 26-33 (summarizing perceived policy problems
presented by explicit elections).

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 29:505

by-case basis, particularly to enable legislative compromise when the tax
law changes.
II. THE TRANSITION POLICY DEBATE
While it is uncontroversial that changes to the tax law help some
people and hurt others, 18 there is greater divergence of opinion regarding
how, if at all, the government should deal with these winners and losers.
The vast majority of the scholarship regarding tax transition policy focuses
on transition losses and whether the government should provide transition
relief. 19 Over time, scholars have taken different positions on this issue,
against, the
with some scholars advocating for, and other scholars arguing
20
losses.
transition
the
mitigate
to
relief
transition
of
provision
For many years, the widely accepted approach to changes in the tax
law was to protect the reliance interest of taxpayers by avoiding nominally
retroactive tax legislation 2 1 and by providing transition relief, typically in
the form of grandfather provisions and phased-in, or delayed, effective
dates. 22 It was argued that nominally prospective laws coupled with
transition relief were appropriate because taxpayers reasonably relied on the
existing law and on the expectation of legal continuity. 23 Moreover, the
rationale was that nominal prospectivity and transition relief were needed to
mitigate the inequities created when surprise changes in the tax law
imposed unanticipated losses (e.g., increased taxes or reduced asset values)
on taxpayers who had made economic decisions in response to the existing
law.

24

18 See, e.g., BLUEPRINTS, supra note 2, at 181; SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 26; Doran,

supra note 4, at 548-49; Kyle D. Logue, If Taxpayers Can't Be Fooled, Maybe Congress
Can: A Public Choice Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHi. L. REv. 1507,
1507 (2000).
19 See Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy:A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 161, 167-68 (2003) [hereinafter Kaplow, Transition Policy] (arguing that
scholars should address transition gains and not just transition losses).
20 Note that the proponents of these different approaches do not claim that their
preferred approach is absolutely desirable in all circumstances. Rather, they tend to argue in
favor of their preferred approach in appropriate contexts. See, e.g., Graetz, Legal
Transitions, supra note 3, at 87; Kaplow, TransitionPolicy, supra note 19, at 164.
21 See, e.g., Comm. on Tax Policy, supra note 6, at 28; Note, supra note 6, at 437-47.
22 BLUEPRINTS, supra note 2, at 189-91 (discussing grandfathering existing assets and
phasing in the new law as alternative methods of providing transition relief).
23 SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 4 ("Most prior work concerning tax transitions
assumes... that people generally err in the direction of assuming the perpetual retention of
current law...."); Alan S. Novick & Ralph I. Petersberger, Retroactivity in Federal
Taxation: PartII, 37 TAXES 499, 499-504 (1959).
24 BLUEPRINTS, supra note 2, at 185. The tax law generally discourages taxpayers from
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Celebrated articles by Professor Michael Graetz 25 and Professor Louis
Kaplow 26 rejected this "old view" and argued that transition relief (and
grandfathering in particular) generally should not be provided. In separate
articles, they argued that "[g]enerally, transitional relief is inefficient
because it insulates investors from the real effects of their decisions, and
thus distorts their behavior"' 2 7 and instead, "[p]eople should make
investments with the expectation that political policies may change." 28 That
is, the provision of transition relief inhibits taxpayers' incentives to
anticipate socially valuable policy changes and impedes the implementation
of those policy changes, thereby reducing the social welfare gains from the
policy changes. Further, Graetz united the discussions about nominal
retroactivity and prospective transition relief by explaining that "the
distinctions commonly drawn between retroactive and prospective effective
dates are illusory" because "all changes in law, whether nominally
retroactive or nominally prospective, will have an economic
• ,29 impact on the
Commentators
value of existing assets or on existing expectations.'
widely embraced the Graetz/Kaplow argument against transition relief for
a few scholars even warmed
nominally prospective tax law changes, 30 and
31
taxation.
retroactive
to the idea of nominally

undertaking transactions that are motivated solely or primarily by tax purposes. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 269(a) (allowing the Secretary to disallow tax benefits from acquisitions the primary
purpose of which was evasion or avoidance of federal income tax); Treas. Reg. § 1.3552(b)(2) (2008) (requiring "a real and substantial non Federal tax purpose germane to the
business" in order for a corporate division to qualify for nonrecognition under section 355).
Nevertheless, it is well recognized that taxpayers have behavioral responses to the tax law
and that the tax law can influence the economic decisions made by taxpayers. Thus, even in
the absence of an improper, solely tax-motivated transaction, a taxpayer may have reliance
interest in the existing law if the tax consequence of a particular action was one of many
factors that the taxpayer took into account when making economic choices.
25 Graetz, Legal Transitions,supra note 3.
26 Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 5.
27 Id. at 513.

28 Graetz, Legal Transitions,supra note 3, at 87.
29 Micheal J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1822 (1985)
[hereinafter Graetz, Retroactivity] (summarizing a key argument made in Graetz, Legal
Transitions,supra note 3, at 49-63).
30 See, e.g., Special Comm. on Simplification, Section of Taxation, ABA, Evaluation
of the Proposed Model Comprehensive Income Tax, 32 TAX LAW. 563, 686 (1979)
(embracing Graetz's argument).
31 See, e.g., Levmore, Retroactive Taxation, supra note 6, at 265, 305-07; Stephen R.
Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REv. 425,444, 448-52 (1982); see
also, e.g., Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 5, at 551-52 (concluding that nominal
retroactivity may be warranted in some situations in order "to produce the proper
incentives").
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Despite the enthusiasm for Graetz's and Kaplow's arguments against
transition relief for nominally prospective tax law changes, some scholars
have tried to reinvigorate the arguments for the provision of transition
relief. Professors Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato argued that the
congressional precommitment to provide transition relief might be
appropriate given the costs of lobbying. 32 They explain that "Congress
should promise to protect taxpayers from its own later tax reform projects"
in order to reduce the amount that interested groups are willing to spend in
order to lobby against the repeal of the law and to lessen legislators'
abilities to "extract protection money" from those interested groups.33
Professor Kyle Logue also advocated for governmental precommitment to
grandfathering of incentive subsidies (i.e., "provisions whose primary
purpose is to alter taxpayers' decisions regarding how they will invest their
resources"). 34 He explained that, absent assurance that the incentive subsidy
will be protected in the event of a change in the law, taxpayers might
demand a premium out of fear of opportunistic behavior by the
government. 35 That is, precommitment to grandfathering may reduce the
total cost to the government of providing an effective incentive subsidy,
thereby enhancing social welfare.
Then, building on the existing literature regarding transitions, Professor
Daniel Shaviro published his book, When Rules Change: An Economic and
Political Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity. In this
comprehensive exploration of transition rules, he argued against the
provision of transition relief for tax policy changes. 36 Shaviro's argument
differed, however, from Graetz's and Kaplow's; Shaviro argued that "tax
legislative politics is quite bad,"'3 7 rejecting Graetz's and Kaplow's
assumption that policy changes in the tax law generally improved social
welfare. 38 Nevertheless, Shaviro argued that, where "there is no general
reason why we should expect things to be getting either systematically

32

J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the ProtectionRacket:

A Reply to Professors Graetz andKaplow, 75 VA. L. REv. 1155, 1157-58 (1989).
33 Id. at 1158,1172.
34 Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits
of

Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1138 (1996).
35 Id. at 1138-39.
36 Professor Shaviro distinguishes between what he calls the "policy content" of a rule
change (i.e., a change that affects the rule's "steady-state allocative and distributional
character") and "accounting content" of a rule change (i.e., implementation details of a rule
change "that could in principle be changed without affecting its policy content"). SHAVIRO,
supra note 2, at 53-54.
37 Id. at 86.

38 Id. at 13.
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better or worse" 39 and given the asymmetry with which Congress typically
treats transition gains and losses,4 0 the best feasible approach to tax policy
changes is to deny transition relief.4 1 Despite Shaviro's support for a norm
denying transition relief for tax policy changes, he generally endorsed the
legislative practice,"
view, "strongly rooted in popular sentiment 4[and]
2
opposing nominally retroactive tax law changes.
Even in this extremely brief discussion of the very rich literature on
transition policy, 43 it is clear that scholars differ on what transition policy
they think is best.44 Despite these differences, the tax transition policy
literature implicitly contemplates that transition rules selected by Congress,
or, in the case of regulations, the Treasury, will apply uniformly, rather than
at the taxpayer's option. 4 5 Of course, taxpayers do have some role in
determining whether they are subject to the old or new rules, and the tax
transition literature acknowledges this role to some degree. For example,
taxpayers can lobby Congress about when a new law will become
effective. 46 Recall that it is this type of taxpayer behavior that concerns
39 Id. at 99-100.
40 Id. at 86, 88-91 ("[D]ecisions to provide grandfathering or other transitional

adjustment are biased in favor of compensating transition losers, rather than eliminating the
gains of transition winners.").
41 Id. at 98-101.
42 Id. at 104-10. Cf Daniel J. Shaviro, When Rules Change Revisited, 13 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 279, 291 (2003) (retreating slightly from this position and concluding that
"this norm lacks the intellectual coherence to be put on a par with the first two norms
[discussed in his book]").
43 This summary is necessarily oversimplified as a result of space constraints, but I
tried to highlight the key parts of the transition debate that will be most relevant to the
discussion of transitional elections.
44 Note that scholars differ not only on whether they favor transition relief or oppose it,
but also on whether Congress should adopt a generally applicable transition policy or
whether transition rules should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Compare Saul
Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations,99 COLUM. L. REv. 1657, 1684 (1999)
(suggesting that it may be useful to retain some flexibility in the manner and extent to which
transition losses are compensated) with Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 5, at 558-60
(favoring "the implementation of a consistent, predictable transition policy"); cf Doran,
supra note 4, at 597 (expressing "agnosticism about whether the better approach would be a
defined tax transition policy or a case-by-case resolution of transition issues as they arise in
connection with particular substantive policy changes.").
45 Scholars who oppose transition relief do not suggest that taxpayers should be able to
opt for transition relief if they really want it, and even scholars who favor transition relief
generally do not suggest that taxpayers should be able to opt out of the transition relief if
they do not want it.
46 Generally, only small, well-informed groups with concentrated interests will be able
to effectively exercise this power to lobby their legislators. See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra
note 32, at 1163-65 (discussing lobbying as part of the legislative process); see also
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Ramseyer and Nakazato. 47 Additionally, taxpayers can modify their
behavior in light of a certain or likely upcoming rule change. For instance, a
taxpayer can try to accelerate a transaction so that it is complete before,
rather than after, the upcoming congressionally-determined effective date of
the new law. 48 Scholars are sensitive to this possibility. The tax transition
literature, however, seems to implicitly assume that Congress will not
explicitly and intentionally cede to each taxpayer affected by a rule change
the power to decide whether transition relief will be afforded to him or
her.

49

Yet, many tax law transition provisions do exactly that. New laws
sometimes allow the affected taxpayers to make explicit elections about
whether the old or new law will apply to them during a transition period.
The next Part discusses a few examples in order to illustrate how
transitional elections are used in the tax law.
III. UNDERSTANDING How TRANSITIONAL ELECTIONS ARE USED

Transitional elections generally fall into two categories: 50 (1)
transitional elections that empower taxpayers to decide whether they would
like the old rule to apply to them even after the enactment of the new law;
and (2) transitional elections that enable taxpayers to decide whether to
apply the new rule to events that occurred before the enactment of the new
law, making the new rule nominally retroactive. 5 1 A few examples can help
illustrate how these two categories of transitional elections are used.
SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 64-81 (discussing public choice problems in the adoption of
transition rules). See generally infra Part IV.B (discussing the relationship between
transitional elections, the legislative process and public choice issues).
47 See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 32, at 1171-73.
48 Similarly, a taxpayer could delay a transaction so that it is completed only after the
effective date of a new law.
49 It is possible that scholars who argue against transition relief in general may be
implicitly arguing against these transitional elections as well. Similarly, scholars who argue
in favor of transition relief may intend to include transitional elections as part of the relief
that could be provided, but they may not because, for example, the provision of transitional
elections seems inconsistent with the strategy of congressional precommitment to particular
transition relief.
so See LANG & KHoURY, supra note 15, at 1.03[4].
51 As Professor Graetz explained, even nominally prospective changes in the tax law
can have retrospective effects. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 49-63; see
also supra note 6 (discussing the concepts of nominal retroactivity and nominal
prospectivity). Nevertheless, the level of scholarly support for nominally retroactive taxation
is lower than the level of scholarly support for denying post-enactment transition relief. See
supra Part II. As a result, the policy analysis of using transitional elections may be somewhat
different depending on whether the transitional election applies to the pre-enactment
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A. Accepting or Rejecting Post-Enactment TransitionRelief

When enacting a new law, Congress may offer post-enactment
transition relief, like grandfather provisions, so that the old law can
continue to apply to certain taxpayers or transactions even after the
enactment of the new legislation. At the same time, Congress may give the
taxpayer the option to accept or reject that transition relief. The impact of
this type of transitional election may be illustrated by two examples: one
where taxpayers can elect into transition relief (as with the transitional
election provided upon the enactment of the current law regarding the tax
treatment of certain gains from the sale of a principal residence) and one
where taxpayers can elect out of transition relief (as with the transitional
election provided upon the amendment of section 355's "active trade or
business" requirement for tax-free corporate divisions). 5 3 The substance of
each law change, and the transitional election relevant to each law change,
is discussed below.
1.

Electing to Accept Transition Relief - Amending the Tax Treatment
of Gains from Sales of Principal Residences

Prior to 1997, a taxpayer did not recognize gain on the sale of his or her
principal residence as long as, within two years before or after the sale, the

taxpayer purchased a new principal residence at least equal in cost to the
sale price of the old residence.54 Additionally, taxpayers over the age of
fifty-five could, on a one-time basis, exclude from income up to $125,000
of gain from the sale of a principal residence if the taxpayer owned and
(nominally retroactive) period or to the post-enactment (nominally prospective) period.
Thus, this discussion of how transitional elections are used in the tax law treats transitional
elections for the post-enactment period (pursuant to which a taxpayer may accept or reject
transition relief) separately from transitional elections for the pre-enactment period (pursuant
to which a taxpayer may elect into or out of nominally retroactive application of a new law).
52 This is only one of two transitional elections that Congress provided when it
changed the tax treatment of gain from the sale of a principal residence. The other
transitional election enacted in connection with the same substantive law change will be
discussed below in Part III.B.2.
53 Of course, the difference between elections to accept transition relief and elections
to reject transition relief is just a difference in the default rule - does the default rule
provide immediate application of the new rule unless a taxpayer elects otherwise, or does the
default rule provide transition relief unless a taxpayer elects immediate application of the
new rule? It is useful, however, to see examples of transitional elections operating in both
directions in order to appreciate how transitional elections function and in order to inform
the later discussion about the impact of default rules on the utility of transitional elections.
See infra Part IV.D.
54 I.R.C. § 1034 (repealed 1997).

516
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used the property as a principal residence for at least three of the five years
preceding the sale. 55 These rules created significant complexity because, in
order to benefit from the exclusions, a taxpayer had to determine his or her
basis in the home, which forced the taxpayer to keep detailed records of
56
transactions and expenditures on home improvements over many decades.
Additionally, these rules "encouraged some taxpayers to purchase larger
and more expensive houses than they otherwise would in order to avoid a
tax liability," which "promoted an inefficient use of taxpayer's financial
resources," and "discouraged some older taxpayers from selling their
57
homes," constraining their mobility.
In order to address these concerns, Congress changed the law in 1997
so that a taxpayer could exclude from income up to $250,000 ($500,000 in
the case of married taxpayers filing jointly) of gain from the sale of a
principal residence, if the taxpayer owned and used the property as a
58
principal residence for at least two of the five years preceding the sale.
This exclusion is available regardless of both the taxpayer's age and
whether the taxpayer purchased a new residence. Further, this exclusion can
be used multiple times during the taxpayer's life. 59 These changes
drastically simplified the record-keeping burdens for homeowners and
helped to lessen the impact of the tax rules on taxpayers' decisions about
whether to sell a home and whether to buy a replacement home (and for
60
how much).
Any sale of a principal residence after the date of enactment was
generally subject to the new law. 6 1 However, Congress allowed certain
55 I.R.C. § 121 (amended 1997).
56 STAFF OF JOINT COMM ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX

LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997, at 54-55 (Joint Comm. Print 1997). In addition to the
record-keeping burden, the need for taxpayers to be able to track their basis meant that
taxpayers had to spend time on "the difficult task of drawing a distinction between
improvements that add to basis, and repairs that do not." Id.
57 Id. at 55.
58 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, sec. 312, § 121, 111 Stat.
788,
836 (as amended by Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, sec. 6005(e), § 121, 112 Stat. 685, 805).
59 I.R.C. § 121. Note that, while the exclusion can be used multiple times during
a
taxpayer's lifetime, the exclusion cannot be used more than once every two years. Id. at §
121(b)(3).

60 See Arthur Andersen LLP, The Taxpayer ReliefAct of 1997, 76 TAX NoTEs 817, 821
(Aug. 18, 1997).
61 The date of enactment of the new law was August 5, 1997. However, the new law
was nominally retroactive and applied to all sales or exchanges of principal residences
occurring after May 6, 1997. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, supra note 56, at § 312(d)(1).
The retroactive application of this new law is also elective; taxpayers had the ability to elect
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taxpayers to elect to be treated under a grandfather rule, so that a sale of a
principal residence would still be subject to the old laws even though the
sale occurred after the date of enactment of the new law.62 The availability
of this transitional election was limited to those taxpayers who had taken
specific actions in reliance on the old law. 63 Specifically, the only taxpayers
eligible to elect into the transition relief were those who, as of the date of
the enactment of the new law, either had a binding contract to64sell the
principal residence or had already purchased replacement property.

Making the transitional election would be beneficial to some taxpayers
and detrimental to other taxpayers, depending on their individual facts and
circumstances.6 5 This transitional election would be desirable if, for
example, a taxpayer eligible to make the election would realize more than
$250,000 (or $500,000 in the case of married taxpayers filing jointly) of
gain on the principal residence and the taxpayer planned to purchase (or had
already purchased) a replacement residence at a cost equal to or greater than
the sale price of the original. In that situation, the entire amount of gain
would be excluded from income if the old law applied, but the income
exclusion would be capped if the new law applied. Thus, a rational taxpayer
would want the benefit of the old law and would likely choose to make the
transitional election.
On the other hand, some taxpayers eligible for the elective transition
relief might decide not to make the election. For instance, consider a

out of its retroactive application. The election with respect to the retroactive application of
this new law is separate and distinct from the election discussed in this Part III.A. 1 regarding
the availability of post-enactment transition relief. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the
retroactive application of the new law and taxpayers' ability to elect out of retroactive
application).
62 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, supra note 56, at § 312(d)(4).
63 As discussed above, Professors Graetz and Kaplow argue persuasively that
taxpayers generally should anticipate the possibility of change and should not have a
protected reliance interest in the existing tax law. Nevertheless, the idea that taxpayers who
rely on the old law should be protected still resonates with some lawmakers, lawyers,
taxpayers and academics. See supra Part II; see also Franklin L. Green, The Folly of LongTerm Tax Planning: Comments on the Instability of the Tax Law, 74 TAx NOTEs 481, 490,
496 (Jan. 27, 1997) (discussing the difficulty faced by tax lawyers and tax planners when
trying to plan for the long term in light of unstable tax laws).
64 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, supra note 56, at § 312(d)(4). Note that the New York
State Bar Association (NYSBA) suggested allowing the transition election to apply more
broadly. New York State Bar Association, NYSBA Offers Comments on Tax Simplification
Proposals,97 TNT 104-15, para. 25 (May 30, 1997).
65 In this context, I assume that taxpayers wish to reduce their taxes and increase the
value of their assets. Choices that have either or both of these effects are assumed to be
beneficial to the electing taxpayer, whereas choices that increase a taxpayer's taxes or
decrease the value of his or her assets are assumed to be detrimental to the electing taxpayer.
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taxpayer over the age of fifty-five who had a binding contract to sell his or
her principal residence at a gain in excess of $125,000 and who did not
want to buy a replacement principal residence. That taxpayer would want
the benefit of the new law 66 and would be unlikely to elect to accept the
transition relief. Thus, even though Congress did not mandate postenactment transition relief in connection with this law change, Congress
gave certain taxpayers the power to opt into a grandfather provision,
thereby allowing each such taxpayer to achieve his or her desired tax
treatment despite the changed law.
2.

Electing to Reject Transition Relief - Amending Section 355's
"Active Trade or Business" Requirement

The transitional election provided when Congress amended the "active
trade or business" requirement for tax-free corporate divisions under section
355 is very similar to the transitional election discussed above in connection
with the adoption of a new law regarding gains from the sale of a principal
residence. However, this transitional election employs a different default
rule and thus works in the opposite direction. That is, with the transitional
election in section 355, the new law generally does provide transition relief
to taxpayers who have evidenced reliance on the old rules, but taxpayers
who want the new rules to apply immediately can elect to reject the
transitional relief.
Specifically, in order for a corporate division to qualify for
nonrecognition under section 355, the division must satisfy several
requirements, including the requirement that the distributing corporation
and the controlled corporations each be engaged in the active conduct of a
trade or business ("ACTB"). 67 The old version of the ACTB requirement
placed a premium on where the active businesses were located in the
corporate structure. 68 As a result, corporations often had to undertake
66 Under the old law, the taxpayer would be able to exclude only $125,000 of gain
from income, but under the new law, the taxpayer would be able to exclude up to $250,000
of gain from income ($500,000 in the case of married taxpayers filing jointly). Compare IRC
§ 121 (amended 1997) with Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, supra note 56, at § 312(b)(2).
67 I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C), (b)(1).
68 Historically, in order for a corporation to be treated as engaged in the active conduct
of a trade or business, the corporation either had to directly engage in the ACTB (the "direct
engagement rule"), or substantially all of the corporation's assets had to consist of the stock
or securities of controlled corporations that were engaged in the ACTB (the "holding
company rule"). I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(A) (2006) (amended 2007). In determining whether a
corporation met the direct engagement rule, the Service historically took the position that the
value of the gross assets of the trade or business being used to satisfy the ACTB requirement
must constitute at least five percent of the total fair market value of the gross assets of the
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significant restructuring just to locate the active businesses in the places
within the corporate structure that would enable the ACTB requirement to
be satisfied. 69 Commentators criticized this restructuring as inefficient and
irrelevant for accomplishing the policy goals of section 355. 70 In response
to this criticism, Congress changed the definition of the ACTB requirement
so that its satisfaction will be determined by looking at the affiliated groups
of the distributing and controlled corporations; 7 ' this change means that the
active conduct of the trade or business can be located anywhere in the
corporation's affiliated group. By decreasing the emphasis on the location
of the ACTB, the amendment
significantly reduced the need for pre72
transaction restructuring.
corporation directly conducting that trade or business. Rev. Proc. 2003-3, 2003-1 I.R.B. 113.
69 For example, assume Corporation X's only assets consisted of all of the stock of
three equally valuable subsidiaries, Corporations M, N, and 0. Assume further that only
Corporation M and Corporation N were treated as engaged in the active conduct of a trade or
business because, for example, Corporation O's business had operated for only two years. A
spin-off of Corporation M would not qualify for nonrecognition treatment under section 355
because, immediately after the spin-off, Corporation X would not be directly engaged in the
active conduct of a trade or business and only fifty percent of Corporation X's assets (and
not substantially all of Corporation X's assets) would consist of stock of controlled
corporations that were engaged in the ACTBs. Several different restructuring alternatives
would allow the spin-off to qualify for nonrecognition treatment under section 355.
Corporation N could liquidate into Corporation X, such that Corporation X would be directly
engaged in the ACTB previously operated by Corporation N. Alternatively, Corporation X
could contribute all of the stock of Corporation 0 to Corporation N, so that, immediately
after the spin-off of Corporation M, the only asset owned by Corporation X would be the
stock of Corporation N; hence, Corporation X would be treated as engaged in the active
conduct of a trade or business by virtue of the holding company rule. See Rev. Rul. 74-79,
1974-1 C.B. 81 (illustrating how restructuring can enable the ACTB requirement to be
satisfied); see also, e.g., Mark J.Silverman, CorporateDivisions Under Section 355, in TAX
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS, 675 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, TAX
LAW AND ESTATE PLANNING COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1079, 1151-57 (2005).

70 See, e.g., William Galanis & Amy Hack, Simplifying Spin-offs: An Examination of
Recently ProposedLegislation Regardingthe Active Trade or Business Requirement, 1 Bus.
ENT. 34, 64 (1999) ("An affiliated group of corporations should not be forced to undergo
extensive preliminary restructuring in order to satisfy the active trade or business
requirement of Section 355.").
71

STAFF OF JOINT COMM.ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., General Explanation of Tax

LegislationEnacted in the 109th Congress, at 272 (Joint Comm. Print 2007) (explaining that
"Congress believed that it is appropriate to simplify planning for corporate groups that use a
holding company structure to engage in distributions that qualify for tax-free treatment under
section 355."); H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 86-91 (2006), as reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N.
234, 287 (describing the change).
72 In the example described in note 69, supra, the corporations would not need to
engage in any restructuring in order for the spin-off to qualify for nonrecognition under
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The amendment to section 355's ACTB rule was generally effective as
of the date of the enactment of the legislation. 73 However, Congress
included a transition rule that provided that the change to section 355's
ACTB requirement would not apply to
any distribution pursuant to a transaction which is - (i) made
pursuant to an agreement which was binding on the date of the
enactment of this paragraph and at all times thereafter, (ii)
described in a ruling request submitted to the Internal Revenue
Service on or before such date, or (iii) described on or before such
date in a public announcement or in a filing with the Securities and
74
Exchange Commission.
This transition rule effectively provided transition relief, in the form of a
grandfather provision, to transactions that were clearly in progress as of the
enactment date of the rule change and thus were likely structured in reliance
on the old rules.
The transition rule also provided taxpayers with the ability to elect to
reject this transition relief.75 If a transitional election was made, 76 then the
new rules would apply to a transaction that would have otherwise been
grandfathered and treated under the old rules. This transitional election
would be desirable if, for example, the new rules would eliminate the need
for restructuring that would have been required in order for a transaction to

section 355. Even without restructuring, Corporation X would be treated as engaged in the
active conduct of a trade or business immediately after the spin-off because there would have
been an ACTB in its separate affiliated group (which included Corporations N and 0). See
generally Robert Willens, Holding Companies and the Active Business Test, 113 TAx NoTEs
87, 88 (Sept. 11, 2006) (explaining how the change reduces the need for restructuring).
73 Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, sec.
202, § 355, 120 Stat. 345, 348.
74 Id.; I.R.C. § 355(b)(3)(C) (as amended in 2006). This transition rule was later
deleted from the Code itself, but the effective date and transition rule were retained off-code
in the public law. Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-172, sec. 4(b)(2),
§ 355(b)(2), sec. 4(d), 121 Stat. 2473, 2475-78 (2007) (amending the text of I.R.C. §
355(b)(3), but retaining the effective date provision in the public law).
75 Note that the legislative history behind the change to section 355's ACTB
requirement does not explain why this transitional election was included with the new law.
Neither the transition rule nor the election was included in the bill when Representative
Thomas introduced the bill on November 10, 2005, but both the transition rule and the
election were included in the first amended version of the bill referred by the Ways and
Means Committee to the entire House on November 17, 2005.
76 I.R.S. Notice 2006-81, 2006-2 C.B. 595 provided guidance regarding the procedure
for making such an election.
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be treated as tax-free under the old rules. 77 In contrast, the transitional
election would not be desirable if, for example, a transaction structured to
qualify for nonrecognition under the old rules might fail to qualify under
the new rules, 78 or if the transaction was intended to be taxable under the
old rules, but the transaction would qualify for tax-free treatment under the
new rules.
Ultimately, section 355's transitional election gave taxpayers the power
to turn a grandfathered effective date into a nominally prospective effective
date. 79 Like the election described above regarding the treatment of gains
from the sale of a principal residence, the section 355 transitional election
provides the best of all worlds to taxpayers who structured their transactions
before the rule change - certain taxpayers who can only achieve their
desired tax treatment under the old rules are protected and get to use the old
rules even though the transaction is consummated after the adoption of the
new rules, and taxpayers who would benefit from the application of the new
rules can elect to have the new rules apply.

77 Consider a transaction that is described in a public announcement before the
effective date. Under section 355's old ACTB rules, the parties may have anticipated
significant corporate restructuring prior to the actual spin-off. However, Section 355's new
ACTB rules may have eliminated the need for that restructuring. As a result, if the
restructuring had been planned but had not occurred before the change in the law, the parties
would likely want the new rules to apply to the transaction because the new rules would
eliminate the need for the restructuring, thereby reducing the transaction costs. Thus, the
parties would prefer to reject the grandfather protection.
78 This is likely to be rare, but it could occur if, for example, the distributing
corporation owned 80% of the voting power and 80% of the number of the nonvoting shares,
but not 80% of the value, of the subsidiary operating the active trade or business. In that
case, the distributing corporation could use the subsidiary's ACTB to meet the ACTB
requirement under the old rules, courtesy of the holding company rule. Under the new rules,
however, the subsidiary would not be part of the distributing corporation's affiliated group,
and thus the subsidiary's ACTB would not be treated as operated by the distributing
affiliated group. See I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) (using the section 368(c) definition of
"control" rather than the section 1504 concept of control).
79 Transitional elections that enable taxpayers to accept or reject transition relief apply
to a variety of different types of transition relief that Congress might offer. The transitional
election in section 355 allows taxpayers to reject grandfathering. There are also transitional
elections that allow taxpayers to reject the phasing in of new rules. See, e.g., Pension
Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, sec. 102, § 303(h)(2)(G), 29 U.S.C. § 1083,
120 Stat. 780, 799 (phasing in section 430's increased funding requirements for single
employer defined benefit plans, but allowing taxpayers to elect out of the phase-in, thereby
making the full standards set by the new law effective immediately).
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B. Electing Into or Out of Nominally Retroactive Application of a New Law
In addition to allowing taxpayers to elect whether to accept or reject
post-enactment transition relief, Congress also sometimes allows taxpayers
to elect whether to apply the new law retroactively to transactions occurring
prior to the date of enactment of the new law. Like the transitional elections
relating to post-enactment transition relief, the elections regarding
retroactive application of a new law go in both directions, depending on the
default rule. In some circumstances, like when Congress enacted section
197 (allowing for amortization of certain intangibles), Congress provides
that the new law is generally applicable prospectively, but then gives
taxpayers the ability to elect to apply the new law nominally retroactively.
In other circumstances, like when Congress changed the law regarding the
exclusion of gain on the sale of a principal residence, Congress provides
that the new law generally applies nominally retroactixkly, but then gives
taxpayers the ability to elect out of that retroactive application. These
examples of transitional elections that enable taxpayers to opt in or out of
nominally retroactive application of the new law will be discussed below.
1.

Electing Retroactivity of Intangibles

Enacting Section 197 to Allow Amortization

In 1993, Congress enacted section 197 in response to the complexity
and uncertainty surrounding the amortization of intangibles. 8 1 Prior to the
enactment of section 197, there was significant controversy about whether
taxpayers could amortize the cost of intangible assets, in part, because
taxpayers had difficulty ascertaining the value of the intangible asset as
separate from goodwill (which was not amortizable), and accurately
establishing the intangible asset's useful life over which its cost could be
amortized. 82 In light of this uncertainty, taxpayers often incurred great
expense in efforts to establish individual valuations and useful lives for
intangibles, 83 and the Service often contested taxpayers' positions. 84 The
80

See supra note 53; supra Part II.A.2; see also infra Part IV.D (discussing default

rules).
81

See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 760 (1993), as reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378,

991.
82 See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1993) (articulating the pre-section 197 rules regarding
amortizability of intangible assets); Gregory M. Beil, Comment, Internal Revenue Code
Section 197: A Cure for the Controversy Over the Amortization of Acquired Intangible
Assets, 49 U. MiAMI L. REv. 731, 735-37 (1995) (describing the controversy around
amortization of intangibles prior to the enactment of section 197).
83 See Beil, supra note 82, at 736-37 (discussing the difficulty taxpayers experienced
in establishing the useful lives and ascertainable values of intangibles); see also Tim Gray,
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enactment of section 197 did not solve the valuation problem, 85 but section
197 did establish a fixed fifteen-year period over which the cost of certain
intangible property (including purchased goodwill) could be amortized
and
ratably. 86 This change provided much greater certainty, clarity,
87
controversy.
with
fraught
been
administrability in an area that had
Newly enacted section 197 generally applied to property acquired after
the date of enactment, which was August 10, 1993. 8 8 However, Congress
provided taxpayers with the ability to elect to apply section 197
retroactively to intangible property acquired after July 25, 1991. 89 The
period for elective retroactivity covered the time period going back to July
25, 1991, the date on which House Ways and Means Committee Chairman
Dan Rostenkowski introduced a bill that was substantially similar to the
statutory provision that was adopted over two years later.90 The legislation
took a long time to enact, 9 1 but the retroactive transitional election allowed
Winners and Losers in Rosty's Intangibles Bill, 52 TAx NOTEs 982, 983 (Aug. 26, 1991)
(discussing GAO findings about the average amortization periods claimed by taxpayers for
different types of intangible assets).
84 See Beil, supra note 82, at 735-37 (discussing the controversies between taxpayers
and the Service); Glenn F. Mackles, 15-Year Amortization of PurchasedIntangible Assets Some Winners, Some Losers, 79 J. TAX'N 332, 332 (1993) (explaining that the "Service
vigorously contested taxpayers' ability to depreciate or amortize the cost of intangible
assets").
85 See Mackles, supra note 84 (explaining that "appraisals are still necessary").
86 I.R.C. § 197. Note that section 197 imposed many limitations on the amortization of
intangibles, including the anti-churning rules of I.R.C. § 197(f)(9).
87 See Beil, supra note 82, at 735, 793.
88 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 13261(g)(1),
§ 197, 107 Stat. 312, 540.
89 Id. at sec. 13261(g)(2). Congress also provided a second election with respect to new
section 197. This additional election provided that, although the new law was generally
effective as of August 10, 1993, a taxpayer could elect to apply the old law to intangibles
acquired after this date if, as of the date of enactment of the new law, the taxpayer had a
binding contract to acquire the intangibles. Id. at sec. 13261(g)(3). This second election is
very similar to the election that allowed a taxpayer selling his or her principal residence to
elect into grandfather protection. See supra Part III.A. 1.
90 H.R. 3035, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. Res. 292, 102d Cong. (1991) (stating that it is
the sense of the House that legislation allowing for the amortization of intangibles be
electively retroactive for the period dating back to the introduction of H.R. 3035). There was
debate about the period for which elective retroactivity would be provided. The Senate
version of one bill would have allowed taxpayers to make an election for all open tax years,
but commentators criticized that approach for rewarding aggressive taxpayers and causing
too much revenue loss. See Herbert L. Camp, Retroactive Intangibles Rules Would be
Windfallfor Aggressive Taxpayers, BarAssociation Says 1992 TNT 212-47 (Oct. 2, 1992).
91 See Beil, supra note 82, at 763-71 (discussing the path from Rostenkowski's 1991
bill to the version of section 197 that was enacted in 1993).
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taxpayers to benefit from the ultimate enactment of section 197 if they
acquired intangible property between the time Rostenkowski's bill was
introduced and the final enactment of the section. Ultimately, the elective
retroactive application of section 197 was less about an effort to help
taxpayers who may have relied on the promise of intangibles legislation,
and more about Congress's desire to enable the resolution of "numerous
pending controversies between taxpayers and the IRS over the [prior]
treatment of acquired intangibles[,] thereby ... clear[ing]
away the
92
substantial load of cases currently on the courts' dockets."
Since section 197 simplified the law regarding the amortization of
intangibles and enabled taxpayers to amortize even purchased goodwill,
many taxpayers may have wanted to elect nominally retroactive application
of this new law. For instance, a taxpayer may have wanted to make the
transitional election if there was uncertainty with respect to his or her
ability to amortize the cost of an intangible asset acquired during the two
year period prior to enactment of section 197. However, some taxpayers
may have been disadvantaged by the retroactive application of the new law,
if, for example, they acquired an intangible asset during the two year period
and they could easily determine the asset's value and accurately establish
that the intangible asset's useful life was shorter than fifteen years. Since
nominally retroactive application of section 197 was elective, these
taxpayers would not be disadvantaged as long as they did not make
transitional elections. Ultimately, section 197's transitional election gave
taxpayers the power to choose nominally retroactive application 93 of an
otherwise nominally prospective new law.

Camp, supra note 88 (reprinting a letter to Rep. Dan Rostenkowski and Sen. Lloyd
Bentsen from the Committee on Taxation of Corporations of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, in which the Committee observes that "the pressure to provide for
retroactive application of the proposed amortization legislation [was] fueled in part" by the
need to resolve controversies and clear dockets). Of course, the elective retroactivity of
section 197 could have been more narrowly tailored and provided only in the cases where
taxpayers had existing controversies about amortization of intangibles. Importantly,
however, that would have rewarded aggressive taxpayers (i.e., the ones who took aggressive
positions and were engaged in controversy as a result) while denying the benefit of new
section 197 to those taxpayers who had taken more conservative positions (e.g., who just
added the cost of an intangible asset acquisition to basis and did not try to amortize the
intangible, and thus who did not have any existing controversies with the Service).
93 Of course, this election only allowed retroactive application of section
197 for a
little over two years. Section 197 did not help taxpayers with respect to intangibles acquired
on or before July 25, 1991.
92
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Rejecting Retroactivity - Amending the Tax Treatment of Gains from
Sales of Principal Residences

Congress also afforded taxpayers the ability to choose between
nominally retroactive and nominally prospective application of the new law
regarding the tax treatment of gains from the sale of a principal residence.
This retroactive transitional election is in addition to the election described
above that allowed a taxpayer who sold a principal residence after the date
of enactment of the new law to choose whether he or she wants to be treated
94
under a grandfather provision.
Congress generally provided that the new law applied to all sales or
exchanges of principal residences after May 6, 1997. 9 5 Thus, the generally
applicable effective date for the new law was three months prior to the
August 5, 1997, date of enactment of the new law. However, Congress
allowed taxpayers to elect to avoid this nominally retroactive application of
the law. 96 To do so, a taxpayer had to make an election indicating that the
taxpayer did not want the new law to apply to any sale or exchange of a
principal residence before the date of enactment of the new law. For any
taxpayer who sold a principal residence during the three months preceding
the date of enactment of the new law, the transitional election may be
desirable or undesirable depending on whether the old law or the new law
would treat the sale more favorably. 9 7 Like with the transitional election
94 See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the other transitional election afforded in

connection with this change in the law); see also supra notes 52, 61 (distinguishing the two
different transitional elections).
95 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, sec. 312(d)(1), § 121, 111 Stat.
788, 841. I have been unable to find a clear explanation about why May 6, 1997, was chosen
as the generally applicable effective date for this new law. Note that (i) this May 6, 1997,
effective date for the new law is slightly after the April 17, 1997, introduction of H.R. 1391,
105th Cong. (1997), which proposed a substantially similar change to the law, and (ii) that,
on May 7, 1997, four representatives introduced a resolution expressing the sense of the
Congress that any exclusion from taxation of capital gains on the sale of a primary residence
enacted during the 105th Congress should be retroactive back to January 1, 1997. H.R. Con.
Res. 76, 105th Cong. (1997).
96 Taxpayer Relief Act, supra note 93, at § 312(d)(2).
97 The old law may be desirable if, for example, a taxpayer realized more than
$250,000 (or $500,000 in the case of married taxpayers filing jointly) on the gain of the
principal residence between May 6 and August 5, and the taxpayer already purchased a
replacement residence at a cost equal to or greater than the sale price of the original
residence. In that situation, the entire amount of gain would be excluded from income under
the old law, but the income exclusion would be capped under the new law. Thus, a rational
taxpayer would want the benefit of the old law and might choose to make the election to
avoid nominally retroactive application of the new law. In contrast, the new law may be
desirable if the taxpayer is over fifty-five years old and did not purchase a replacement
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available in connection with the enactment of section 197, this transitional
election allowed taxpayers to choose whether or not to apply a new law
nominally retroactively. Thus, some taxpayers benefited 98 from the change
in law even for transactions that occurred prior to the enactment of the new
law, and at the same time, other taxpayers who acted before the change in
the law were taxed under the old law.
IV. EVALUATING THE ROLE OF ELECTIONS IN TRANSITION POLICY
With an understanding of how transitional elections are commonly
used in the Code, the role of elections in tax transition policy can be
evaluated. Specifically, this Part will analyze transitional elections in light
of the different theories about transition policy, reflecting on the role of
taxpayer expectations and on the public choice criticisms of the legislative
process. This Part will also discuss how the availability of individual choice
may function in the context of tax transitions and consider the impact of
transitional elections on issues of revenue, complexity, and tax
administration. Ultimately, this Part concludes that, while there are some
compelling arguments against the use of transitional elections, transitional
elections may be useful on a case-by-case basis, particularly in order to
enable legislative compromise about how to shift from an old law to a new
law and in order to provide the Service with valuable information about
taxpayer preferences.
A. TransitionalElections and Taxpayer Expectations about Changes
in the Law
As discussed in Part II, arguments about transition policy often depend
heavily on taxpayers' expectations about changes in the law and on how the
law should treat those expectations. Scholars who are persuaded that
taxpayers have a legitimate interest in relying on the existing law because of
concems about the value of certainty in the law, 99 the inequity of imposing
unanticipated losses (e.g., unexpected increases in tax liabilities or
decreases in asset values) on taxpayers, 1°° or otherwise, generally argue
against retroactive tax changes and for transition relief. On the other hand,
those who conclude that taxpayer reliance on existing law is unwarranted
because taxpayers should anticipate that policies may change, 1° 1 or who
property.
98 See supra note 65.
99 See, e.g., Comm. on Tax Policy, supra note 6, at 21-22.

oo See, e.g., BLUEPRINTS, supra note 2, at 185; Note, supra note 6, at 439.
101 See, e.g., Graetz, Retroactivity,supra note 29, at 1823-24; Munzer, supra note 31, at
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conclude that protecting taxpayers' reliance on existing law is undesirable
10 2
because it impedes the adoption of socially valuable policy changes,
generally argue against transition relief and sometimes in favor of
retroactivity.
While most transition relief provisions only reflect one of these
approaches and not both, 10 3 transitional elections can reconcile the two
views by reflecting both approaches simultaneously. With a transitional
election that enables taxpayers to decide whether the old or the new law
applies to them for some period after the date of enactment of the new law,
or even retroactively for some period before the date of its enactment, the
transitional election allows those who may have relied on the old law to
choose to be subject to the old law. This may protect their reliance interest.
At the same time, other taxpayers can choose to have the new law apply to
them without delay, and possibly even retroactively; this accelerates the
implementation of the new law and rewards those who anticipated the
04
change. 1
For example, consider a taxpayer who sold a home within three months
prior to the date of enactment of the new law regarding gains from the sale
430.
102 See, e.g., Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 5, at 552-53; Michael J.
McIntyre, Transition Rules: Learning to Live with Tax Reform, 4 TAx NOTES 7, 7 (Aug. 30,
1976).
103For example, a delayed effective date enables all taxpayers to rely, at least for some
period, on the pre-existing rules. While this may help protect reliance interests to some
degree, the delayed effectie date reduces (or denies) the benefits received by any taxpayers
who anticipated a socially useful change in the law. A narrowly drawn grandfather provision
is the non-elective transition relief that comes closest to being able to protect both reliance
and anticipation. If the grandfather provision applies only to those situations where taxpayers
have clearly evidenced action in reliance on the old rules (for example, the binding contract
or public announcement requirements for grandfathering in the change to section 355's
ACTB requirement), then the transition provision, even without the election, protects the
reliance interest of those who have taken actions that demonstrate reliance. All other
taxpayers are treated under the new rule, since they are presumed not to have relied enough
to justify protecting any such reliance. Nevertheless, a narrowly drawn grandfather provision
delays the application of socially valuable policy changes to taxpayers who may have taken
certain actions before the enactment of the new law. That said, adding an election to a
narrowly drawn grandfather provision may actually undermine the "reliance" explanation for
transition relief because the election would allow taxpayers whose actions evidenced
reliance on the old rules to benefit from the new rules, despite taxpayers' original
expectations.
104 Of course, as discussed later in this Part, this likely means that all taxpayers eligible
for the transitional election win at the expense of the fisc. However, to the extent that there is
a good reason to protect reliance despite a desire to accelerate the implementation of a new
rule, perhaps allowing affected taxpayers to choose the rule applicable to them is an
acceptable result.
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of a principal residence. 10 5 If the taxpayer acted in reliance on the rule that
allowed for the deferral of all of the gain as long as a replacement home of
equal value was purchased, the taxpayer's reliance interest could be
protected through an election to have the old law apply to that transaction.
If the taxpayer acted in anticipation of the enactment of the new law while
Congress was considering the legislation, the taxpayer can opt to have the
new law apply to the transaction by declining to make the transitional
election. This rewards anticipation of the change in law. Even if the
taxpayer did not anticipate the change in the law, the implementation of a
presumably socially valuable law change 106 will be accelerated as long as
the taxpayer does not elect the transition relief
Moreover, the ability of taxpayers to elect retroactive application of a
new law defeats a major argument against nominally retroactive taxation that laws that change the legal consequences of pre-enactment actions
unfairly upset taxpayer expectations with respect to the consequences of
such actions. 10 7 Where the taxpayer is the person who chooses to apply the
new law to his or her pre-enactment actions, application of the new law to
the prior actions is unlikely to disadvantage the taxpayer, and to the extent
the taxpayer is disadvantaged, the disadvantage is not caused against the
taxpayer's will. 108 Similarly, the Treasury can issue regulations with
retroactive effect only in certain circumstances, 10 9 one of which is where
the regulation applies retroactively at the taxpayer's election. 110 This use of
transitional elections helps to ensure that taxpayers are not adversely
affected if they took reasonable actions based on the existing statute before
the issuance of the temporary or final regulations; I '' at the same time, using

105 See supra Parts III.A.1, III.B.2.

106 People may disagree about whether this change was good or bad. However, the

point here is not to endorse section 121's treatment of gain from the sale of a principal
residence. Rather, the point is merely that the election enables the change in tax law to be
accelerated at the taxpayer's option. That is desirable if the change in the law is socially
valuable, although not all changes are.
107 Comm. on Tax Policy, supra note 6, at 23-28.
108 This is a stronger argument where the default rule is nominally prospective
application of the new law and where the election allows optional retroactivity. The
argument is weaker if the default rule is nominal retroactivity, and taxpayers have to make
an affirmative election to avoid this retroactivity. In the latter situation, there is a greater risk
that some taxpayers, particularly less sophisticated taxpayers, will be adversely affected
without affirmatively choosing such treatment.
109 I.R.C. § 7805(b).
I1O Id. § 7805(b)(7).
I There is often a significant time delay between the enactment of a new statutory
provision and the issuance of regulations thereunder. Note that proposed regulations present
a slightly different situation. Specifically, proposed regulations have limited precedential
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a transitional election to allow retroactive application of a treasury
regulation enables taxpayers,12at their option, to benefit from the guidance

provided by the regulations. 1
Despite these possible benefits, transitional elections can also
undermine taxpayer expectations in a manner that produces windfalls for
taxpayers at the expense of the fisc. For example, transitional elections can
create windfall gains by allowing a taxpayer to choose to apply the new law
to a post-enactment transaction even if the taxpayer actually relied on the
old law when planning the transaction. These gains are most problematic if
the change in law is not socially valuable," 3 in which case, the real
problem is with the change in the law and not the availability of a
transitional election.
Windfall gains can also arise when a taxpayer who did not rely on the
old law when planning a transaction elects to have the old law apply to a
post-enactment transaction merely because the old law produces a better tax
result than the new law. However, the risk of conferring this type of
transition gain on taxpayers who took action prior to the enactment of a new
law exists whether the transition relief is elective or mandatory. 114 The risk
that a transitional election will create this type of post-enactment windfall
can be mitigated either (1) by narrowly defining the taxpayers or
transactions that are entitled to elect grandfather protection, as in the
transitional elections used in the change to section 355's ACTB

authority. Accordingly, while they provide guidance to taxpayers about how the Service
might ultimately resolve a particular issue, taxpayers are not obliged to follow proposed
regulations. This makes proposed regulations effectively, although not explicitly, elective
while the tax rule remains in flux. In part, this is because proposed regulations, by their very
nature, mean that the Service has not yet decided how to handle a particular situation, so
taxpayers have some flexibility. That is different from the explicit elections discussed in this
paper, where the Service has decided how to handle a particular situation, and that decision
entails, at least in part, letting the affected taxpayers make their own choice.
112 Typically, the period of elective retroactivity of treasury regulations dates back to
around the time when the relevant Code section was enacted or revised. See, e.g., Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2T(i)(1), (i)(3) (2009) (providing that the "hot stock" regulations apply
to corporate divisions after the date of the regulations, but allowing taxpayers to retroactively
elect to apply these regulations to transactions occurring back to the date on which the
relevant statutory provision was changed).
113 This might suggest that the provision of transitional elections should depend on the
quality of the new law. However, it may be difficult to determine whether a change in the
law is good or bad, in which case it may be problematic to tie transition policy to the quality
of the law change. See SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 47-48, 86-88, 98-101.
114 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 2, at 189; Graetz, Legal Transitions,supra
note 3, at 87.
Whether relief is elective or mandatory does not affect the availability of the windfall
because a rational taxpayer will opt to receive any available windfall by exercising the
transitional election in a way that best reduces the taxpayer's tax burden.

530
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requirement or in the change to the treatment of gains on sale of a principal
residence, or (2) by using a phased-in effective date or a delayed effective
date (rather
than a grandfather rule at all) as the transition relief that may be
5
elected. " 1
Additionally, transitional elections can create gains when taxpayers are
given the ability to choose whether to apply the new law retroactively;
windfall gains arise in this context because taxpayers may get the benefit of
a new policy even if they did not anticipate the change in the law. This
concern may be most obvious in the context of incentive subsidies. 116 For
example, if an incentive subsidy is applied retroactively, it will serve to
reward those taxpayers who correctly anticipated a socially valuable change
in the law, but other taxpayers, who would have undertaken the incentivized
action without the subsidy, just get a windfall. 1 17 This is a problem with
retroactive tax legislation regardless of whether retroactivity is elective
because neither mandatory nominal retroactivity nor elective nominal
retroactivity can effectively distinguish between these different types of
taxpayers. 118 Moreover, if the change in the law is not socially valuable,
then elective retroactivity exacerbates the negative consequences of the
9
change. "1
Further, even though a taxpayer who chooses to apply the law
retroactively may not be disadvantaged against the taxpayer's will, other
taxpayers may be harmed. Taxpayers who have the option to apply the law
retroactively but choose not to (for simplicity reasons, due to lack of
knowledge about the ability to make the retroactive election, or otherwise)
may end up paying more tax than similarly situated taxpayers who did
choose retroactive application of the new law. 120 Additionally, the ability of
115 Commentators have argued that phased-in effective dates and delayed effective

dates are much less likely to create windfall gains than are grandfather provisions. See
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 2, at 189-91; Graetz, Legal Transitions,supra note 3, at 87.
116 See Logue, supra note 34, at 1133.

117 Alternatively, this "windfall" could be viewed as a reward for having undertaken
"good" behavior. However, efficient incentive subsidies should use the smallest "incentive"
that will effectively bring about the desired level of the desired behavior, so it seems
unnecessary and inefficient to provide such a reward to taxpayers that would have
undertaken the desired behavior without the subsidy.
118 Nevertheless, when retroactivity is elective, taxpayers will generally only opt for
retroactive application of the new law if it is taxpayer favorable. In contrast, if retroactivity
is mandatory, then the new law will apply retroactively to all taxpayers whether or not it is

taxpayer favorable.
119 Note that I do not believe that, when changing the law, Congress endeavors to make
the law worse. Rather, I just acknowledge that some law changes may not be beneficial. Cf
SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 45-47, 86-88, 99-100.
120 For a discussion of the harm to the fisc, and thus to the taxpayers who are not
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taxpayers to choose to apply the law retroactively may generate as much of
a sense of unpredictability in, and unfairness of, the tax system as
congressionally mandated nominal retroactivity of a new law. 121
Nevertheless, for those situations where nominal retroactivity may be
desirable, 122 making retroactivity elective may enable Congress to allow for
a longer period of retroactivity than Congress may have been able or
willing to mandate. For example, the more than two year period of elective
retroactivity for section 197 is quite long given that Congress generally
does not enact legislation that is effective earlier than January 1 of the year
of enactment. 123 At the same time, making retroactivity elective rather than
mandatory may minimize the potential harm to those taxpayers whose prior
actions were undertaken in reliance on prior law.
Despite the risks that transitional elections can create windfall gains to
taxpayers and despite the corresponding adverse impact on the fisc, 124 the
ability of transitional elections to simultaneously protect reliance interests
and allow for the acceleration of the implementation of, and reward
anticipation of, socially valuable changes in the law means that transitional
elections may help enable compromises in certain lawmaking situations.
This compromise approach may have some value, particularly where
legislators have difficulty balancing the merits of allowing policy changes
to have retroactive effect and rapid implementation, on one hand, against
the merits of protecting reliance interests and avoiding nominal retroactivity
125
in the law, on the other.

eligible for the transitional election, see infra Part IV.D.
121 See id. All explicit elections, not just transitional elections, raise fairness concerns
about treating similarly situated taxpayers differently because electivity "allows persons
undertaking the same activity to obtain different tax results," among other reasons. STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE
ANALYSIS 65 n.149 (Joint Comm. Print 2008). See generally Field, supra note 12, at 31-32
(discussing fairness as a problem presented by the use of explicit elections).
122See, e.g., Levmore, Retroactive Taxation, supra note 6, at 273-78
(discussing when
and why retroactivity may be appropriate).
123 See SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 105. Of course, whether the effective date of a new
law is the date of enactment, January 1 of the year of enactment, or some other specific date,
a line is still drawn between taxpayers who are or may be subject to the new rule and
taxpayers who are not. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the line-drawing issue).
124See infra Part IV.D (discussing the likely revenue impact of transitional elections).
125 Cf SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 110-11 (identifying the possible conflict between the
norm of "allow[ing] the imposition of policy change retroactive taxes" and the norm of
"prevent[ing] the imposition of nominally retroactive taxes", and concluding that the antinominal retroactivity norm should prevail).
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B. TransitionalElections, the Legislative Process, and Public Choice
The ability to use transitional elections to compromise on transition
policy may also be useful in light of the imperfect process through which
legislation is made. 126 The literature on the legislative process and public
choice explains that "concentrated interest groups often benefit at the
expense of more widely scattered groups, even if the diffuse group has
much more at stake overall."' 12 7 These concentrated interest groups can
employ lobbyists to try to influence tax (and other) legislation, 128 and
legislators can extract rents from these interest groups in various forms,
including campaign contributions. 129 The impact of interest group politics is
not limited to the substantive tax legislation itself; public choice problems
can arise in the transition context as well. 13 For example, interest groups
may lobby for generous transition relief in order to protect the members of
the group from the application of a disadvantageous new law, and interest
groups may advocate for retroactive application of a taxpayer-favorable
new law so that members of the group may benefit from the new law even
31
for transactions that occurred before enactment.
While these small, concentrated groups of vocal constituents may press
for a particular transition policy, there may be larger, diffuse groups who
may prefer a different approach to the transition, but who cannot effectively
lobby for their preferred approach due to problems of aggregation,
126

See, e.g., id. at 64-66 (describing some of the problems in the legislative process);
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 32, at 1171-73 (discussing lobbying by special interests
and rent extraction by legislators).
127

David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced

Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REv. 647, 652 (1997). The seminal work in the study of
interest group politics is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). See also SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 66-73 (explaining
the role of problems of aggregation, organization, and information in political public choice);
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv.
873 (1987).
128 Doran, supra note 4, at 567-68 (discussing "interest group politics"); Ramseyer
&
Nakazato, supra note 32, at 1171-73; see also JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY,
SHOWDOWN AT GUCCi GULCH 32-33, 121-22, 176-82 (1988) (including discussions of the
role of lobbyists in the story of the 1986 tax reform); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice
and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustratedby Tax Legislation in

the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1,21-26 (1990) (describing the history of tax legislation in the
1980s, and noting the involvement of lobbyists and interest groups).
129 See Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 32, at 1171-73.
130 See id.; see also SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 73-81; Levmore, supra note 6, at 279-88
(discussing "interest groups as opponents of retrotaxation").
131 See generally SHAVIRO, supra note 2, at 73-81 (detailing the political choice
problems posed by transition policy).
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organization, or information. 132 A non-elective policy of transition relief or
retroactivity may favor the former constituents at the expense of the
latter, 133 or vice versa. In contrast, an elective transition provision may
strike a compromise that acknowledges that different groups of taxpayers
may have different preferences regarding transition policy, even if some
groups are unable to communicate their preferences to their legislators
effectively.
By providing taxpayers with the ability to elect whether or not to
accept transition relief or apply a new law retroactively, the choice about
how to handle the transition is disaggregated. Each individual taxpayer with
sufficient information can make an independent choice about his or her
desired approach to the transition; 134 each taxpayer can achieve his or her
preferred transition treatment without the power or expense of an organized
lobbying group. As a result, the silent, unorganized group of taxpayers
would not be subjected to the transition policy desired by only the special
interests. Thus, a transitional election can provide an opportunity to reach a
legislative compromise when legislators who believe that one approach to
the transition is likely more appropriate from a pure policy perspective have
difficulty resisting the political pressure to take a different approach to the
transition. 13 5 Lobbying and involvement of interest groups in the legislative

132

See id. at 66-73. The point here is to acknowledge the possibility of a divergence

between the preferences of vocal constituents and quiet constituents. Of course, the
preferences of a majority of taxpayers may align with the preferences expressed by the vocal
few. As a result, we should not assume that the quiet want something different than the
vocal, but we should be sensitive to the possibility.
133 One need not assume any improper intentions by the legislators in order for this to
be a plausible outcome. This is, in part, because legislators may lack information about the
transition preferences of the silent, diffuse group.
134 Unfortunately, as is the case with many other explicit elections, taxpayers may lack
sufficient information to make tax-minimizing decisions about how to exercise a transitional
election. In the absence of sufficient information for taxpayers, allowing private choice in
transitions may be more harmful than helpful, particularly with respect to less
knowledgeable, less sophisticated taxpayers. Thus, it may be unwise to use transitional
elections where taxpayers are unlikely to be able to make educated decisions about how to
exercise the election. At the very least, transitional elections should generally employ default
rules that meet the expectations or preferences that a majority of taxpayers would have if the
taxpayers had sufficient information (assuming those expectations or preferences can be
determined by legislators). See infra Part IV.D (discussing how default rules can be designed
to minimize the risk that transitional elections will adversely affect unsophisticated
taxpayers).
135 Consider, for example, a legislator who believes that the new law reflects better
policy and who wants to implement it right away, but who is sympathetic to pleas for
protection for actions taken in reasonable reliance on pre-existing law. Similar compromises
might be struck when some group of legislators wants to implement a new policy right away,
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process is part of our current political reality; consequently, absent an
expectation that legislators will resist these pressures, a transitional election
compromise may be a plausible way for legislators to protect the transition
interests of the quiet, diffuse group of taxpayers.
There is a risk that increased use of transitional elections would just
encourage more extensive lobbying by competing interest groups who
desire different approaches to the transition, thereby exacerbating
legislators' abilities to extract rents from interested parties. In particular, if
members of the more diffuse group realize that there is a compromise
option to transition policy, where they could obtain something valuable
merely by making a case to their legislators, without the need to outdo the
small, powerful group (which they would be unable to do), the members of
the more diffuse group might participate in lobbying efforts that might have
previously been futile. Nevertheless, allowing affected taxpayers to
determine whether a new or old law will apply to them during a transitional
period could provide a mechanism for legislators to protect silent, diffuse
groups despite the power of interest groups involved in transition policy. As
a result, in certain situations, transitional elections may help limit the
impact of the public choice problem by turning a transition policy decision
into a private choice for each affected taxpayer.
C. The Role of Individual Choices in Transitions
The provision of this type of individual choice through transitional
elections 136 may reveal information about taxpayers and enhance neutrality,
thereby conferring policy benefits independent of the arguments about
transition policy and public choice. For example, to the extent that the
137
Service can track information about the exercise of transitional elections,

but other legislators have been persuaded that transition relief is needed. These types of
conflicts often lead to legislative compromises. See Doran, supra note 4, at 569-72
(discussing the role of compromise in the enactment of tax legislation).
136 Transitional elections are only a subset of the many situations in which the tax law
enables taxpayers to make individual choices about how the tax law will apply to them.
Some of these individual choices, like transitional elections, are explicit tax elections,
pursuant to which taxpayers can check a box or file a form to tell the Service how they
would like to be treated for tax purposes. Such explicit tax choices are distinguished from
implicit tax choices, pursuant to which "the taxpayer arranges his economic and/or legal
affairs so as to qualify for his desired tax treatment." Field, supra note 12, at 22.
137 In order for transitional elections to produce this kind of information for
policymakers, the Service must be able to identify how many taxpayers make a particular
transitional election and how many do not. The Service keeps data on many elections made
by taxpayers. See, e.g., Heather M. Field, Checking In on "Check-the-Box ", 42 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 451, app. at 525-27 (2009) (utilizing data obtained from the Service's Statistics on
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the information revealed by taxpayers' choices may prove useful to
legislators in understanding taxpayer reactions to the new law 138 and in
appreciating if and how the preferences of a broad spectrum of taxpayers
differ from the preferences of vocal interest groups. That information may
be relevant when legislators make future decisions about analogous
transition issues.
Further, the Service may be able tailor its enforcement efforts based
upon information gleaned from the transitional elections made by
taxpayers. 139 For example, consider the election that allowed taxpayers to
apply section 197 retroactively to intangibles acquired during the two plus
years preceding enactment. 14 By making the election, taxpayers effectively
14 1
agreed to a fifteen-year amortization period for the relevant intangibles.
Taxpayers who amortized intangibles acquired between July 25, 1991 and
August 10, 1993, but who did not make the election, likely claimed shorter
amortization periods for their intangibles. The transitional election may
have enabled the Service to direct more enforcement efforts towards the
non-electing taxpayers and focus efforts to dispute ascertainable useful lives
of intangibles on the assets owned by this smaller, self-identified group of
taxpayers.
In addition to the valuable information revealed when taxpayers
exercise elections, the provision of a transitional election may confer
neutrality benefits by reducing the influence that the change in the tax law
exerts on taxpayers' business decisions. 142 Without the transitional election,
there is a temporal discontinuity between the old and new laws; 14 3 that is, a

Income Division about the number of entity classification elections made since 1997). The
harder information to obtain is often the number of taxpayers who do not make an election
and are taxed under the default rule. In some situations, this may be measurable indirectly by
subtracting the number of elections made from the total number of taxpayers/transactions
eligible for the election.
138 In effect, explicit elections enable taxpayers to cast a vote about which version of
the law they prefer. See Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHt. L. REv. 387, 387-89
(1998).
139 See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choices to Target Tax
Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 689,689, 707-10 (2009) (proposing that taxpayers be able
to elect between two different enforcement regimes and discussing the Service's ability to
target its enforcement efforts based on the choices made by taxpayers).
140 See supra Part III.B.1.
141 I.R.C. § 197(a).
142 Field, supra note 12, at 36-37 (explaining that explicit elections that resolve
discontinuities in the tax law can make the law more neutral).
143 See id. at 35 (arguing that "reconciling discontinuous regimes" is one major
potentially useful function of explicit elections in the tax law). The discontinuity here is
temporal; any change in the tax law creates this type of discontinuity because a law change
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small change in the date on which a transaction is undertaken can result in a
large change in the tax treatment of the transaction because of the effective
date of the new law. 144 A transitional election may be able to mitigate this
result more effectively than mandatory transition relief. Of course,
transition relief itself is intended to ease the impact of a change in law, even
without an election. However, even where Congress provides transition
relief via a grandfather provision, phased-in effective date or delayed
effective date, the transition policy still creates a bright line between the
period governed by the old law and the period governed by the new law.
Similarly, since Congress rarely makes legislation nominally retroactive,
there is commonly a bright line separating the periods before and after the
14 5
enactment of a new law.
As a result of these bright lines, taxpayers may have an incentive to
accelerate or delay a transaction solely for tax reasons. Allowing each
taxpayer to make an individual choice about whether the old or new law
applies during a transitional period may reduce this incentive and may
increase the taxpayer's ability to undertake transactions on the timeframe
that is optimal for the taxpayer's non-tax business purposes. Note that any
limitations on the availability of the transitional election (e.g., which
taxpayers can make the election, how long the election is available, etc.)
themselves create other (and possibly a greater number of) bright lines, each
of which may create a discontinuity in the application of the law. However,
the availability of an election spreads out the bright lines, thereby
deemphasizing the importance of the single moment in time when the law
would otherwise change. This gives taxpayers more flexibility to arrange
their affairs in the way that is optimal for business purposes, and thus, the
election may reduce the overall magnitude of the inefficiencies and
inequities created by the discontinuities. As a result, using a transitional
election rather than a congressionally mandated transition rule might lessen
the extent to which a law change distorts taxpayers' actions around the time
of the change in the law. 146

gives rise to two different tax regimes - one applicable before the effective date of the
change, and one applicable after the effective date of the change.
144 Cf Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46

STAN. L. REV. 569, 597-98, 602-05 (1994) (explaining what it means for there to be
"continuity" in the tax law).
145 Even when the law is nominally retroactive, there is still a bright line, but the bright
line occurs before the date of enactment of the new law.
146 See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES:

A CITIZEN'S

GUIDE TO THE

DEBATE OVER TAXEs 131 (4th ed. 2008) ("A major goal of tax reform is to make our tax
system more "neutral" so that it exerts less unwanted influence on our economic choices.").
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D. The Impact of TransitionalElections on Revenue, Complexity,
andAdministrability Issues
Despite the potential benefits of using transitional elections, an elective
approach to transitions in the tax law suffers from potentially serious
problems. In addition to the above-discussed concerns, transitional elections
are clearly revenue-reducing. 47 Any transition relief is costly, even without
an election. 14 8 The addition of an election to a transition provision likely
exacerbates the revenue effect of the transition policy. This is because, with
the addition of an election, a rational taxpayer will exercise a transitional
1 49
election in a way that most effectively reduces his or her tax burden.
Since both the taxpayers who benefit from the transition relief and the
taxpayers who benefit from the accelerated adoption of the new rule will be
able to reduce their tax burdens, the availability of the election likely
reduces revenue even more than non-elective transition relief.
Moreover, transitional elections can be quite complex. Changing the
tax law creates complexity itself because taxpayers must understand the
new law and must be able to determine whether the old or new law applies
to them. Adding a transitional election compounds this complexity because,
in order to exercise the transitional election in a way that minimizes
taxation, taxpayers have to understand how both the old and new laws
would apply to them and determine which law produces the better result.
This may not be particularly problematic because taxpayers will often
compare the application of the old law with the application of the new law
even in the absence of a transitional election. 15 However, unsophisticated
taxpayers may lack meaningful choice if they are unaware of the election or
unable to effectively evaluate how the law change affects them. Further,
transitional elections can be complex even for sophisticated taxpayers
because many transitional elections are enacted off-code; 151 the transitional
147 See Field, supra note 12, at 30 (explaining why it is "virtually axiomatic" to say
that

elections are revenue reducing).
148 Commentators have devoted significant amounts of time to comparing the relative
costs of different methods of transition relief. See, e.g., Graetz, Legal Transitions,supra note
3, at 57-63 (comparing the costs of different methods of transition relief).
149 See supra Part III (giving examples of how taxpayers may want to elect to apply an
old rule rather than a new rule, or vice versa, in order to better reduce their tax burdens).
150 For example, if a new law is adopted with a delayed effective date, the taxpayer may
want to compare how a planned transaction will be taxed under the old law and under the
new law. Depending on which result is preferable, the taxpayer may decide to accelerate or
delay the transaction in order to achieve the taxpayer's desired tax result.
151See, e.g., supra note 74 (off-code transitional election for the change to section
355's ACTB requirement); supra notes 62, 95 (off-code transitional elections for the change
to the tax treatment of gain from the sale of a principal residence).
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election is in the public law enacting the change, but the transitional
election is not actually codified in the Code. 152 This increases the difficulty
of determining whether a transitional election may be available and, if so,
how it might apply. Additionally, the enactment of off-code transitional
elections reduces the transparency of the law, which can adversely impact
the perception of fairness in the law.
Further, transitional elections enacted by Congress rarely articulate
how a taxpayer can make the election. 153 The technical details for making
the election generally must be explained in regulations or other
administrative pronouncements. 154 While this is commonly the case with
explicit tax elections,1 55 the time lag between the enactment of a transitional
election and the issuance of guidance regarding how to make that election
may be particularly problematic in the context of legal transitions because
transitional elections are often relevant only for a short window of time.
Absent guidance about how to make a transitional election, a taxpayer may
be unable to make the election, or a taxpayer may try to delay the decision
about whether to make the transitional election until guidance is published,
which could keep returns open for a long period of time and hamper the
156
administration of the tax laws.
Some, but not all, of these concerns about complexity and
administrability can be mitigated by carefully designing the transitional
election. For example, each transitional election should provide a default
rule that articulates how a taxpayer who does not make an election will be
treated. Default rules are the difference between the election to reject

152

See Christopher H. Hanna, The Magic in the Tax Legislative Process, 59 SMU L.

REV. 649, 658-62 (2006) (discussing the use of off-code provisions as a "gimmick" in tax
legislation).
153 For example, none of the statutes providing for the transitional elections described in
Part III explained how to make the relevant elections.
154 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2006-81, 2006-2 C.B. 595 (explaining how to make the
transitional election with respect to the change to section 355's ACTB requirement).
155 See generally Field, supra note 12, at 28, 70-71 (discussing this as a common
problem with explicit elections in general).
156 See LANG & KHouRY, supra note 15, at

1.03[4]. On the other hand, elections can
be used to enhance administrability by reducing the risk that a taxpayer will take inconsistent
positions and whipsaw the government. For example, if a taxpayer elects into grandfather
protection with respect to the amortization of intangible assets acquired after August 10,
1993, that election applies to "all property acquired pursuant to the [binding] contract with
respect to which such election was made." Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, sec. 13261(g)(3), § 197, 107 Stat. 312, 540; see also supra note 89
(describing this election). That is, by making the transition election, the taxpayer agrees not
to take inconsistent approaches to amortizing intangibles acquired pursuant to the binding
contract.
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transition relief (like for the change to section 355's ACTB requirement)
and the election to accept post-enactment transition relief (like for the
57
change to the rules regarding gain on the sale of a principal residence).1
Similarly, the difference between electing into retroactivity, as in section
197, and electing out of retroactivity, as in the pre-enactment election for
the change to the rules regarding gain on sale of a principal residence, is
merely an issue of the default rules. 158 While the choice of default rule does
not change the substance of the tax treatments available to the taxpayer, the
59
default rule can have a significant impact on how the election operates.'
For instance, the number of elections that need to be filed can be reduced,
and the potential harm to taxpayers who lack the knowledge or
sophistication to make an election can be minimized, by adopting
transitional election default rules that correspond to the expectations and
assuming that those
preferences of a majority of affected taxpayers,
160
determined.
be
can
preferences
and
expectations
Additionally, transitional elections can be simplified by drawing clear
and narrow boundaries defining those situations in which the transition
decision is ceded to the taxpayer. Eligibility requirements for the
transitional election should be carefully defined to accomplish the objective
behind the provision of the election. 161 For example, if the goal of a
transitional election is to protect taxpayers who may have relied on an old
rule, then only taxpayers whose actions clearly evidence reliance on those
old rules should be eligible to make the election. The elective grandfather
provisions discussed herein do just that; they limit the post-enactment
election to those taxpayers who took specific actions that reflect reliance on
a corporate division or buying a
the old rules, like publicly announcing
•. 162
Additionally, limiting the time period
replacement principal residence.
can help to simplify the administration
be
made
may
the
election
which
for
of the election. For instance, for retroactive transitional elections, there may
be a desire to extend the period of elective retroactivity back over a period
of years. 163 The desire for retroactivity should be balanced, however, with
157 See supra Part III.A.
158 See supra Part III.B.

159 See Field, supra note 12, at 66-69 (discussing the choice of default rules for explicit
elections).
160 As the discussion regarding public choice and the legislative process demonstrates,
it can sometimes be difficult to ascertain the preferences of a majority of affected taxpayers.
See supra Part IV.B.
161 See Field, supra note 12, at 69-70 (discussing the choice of eligibility limitations for
explicit elections).
162 See supra Part III.A.

163 See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
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the complexity that may arise if the election causes taxpayers to go back
and amend tax returns from several past years.
While the revenue, complexity, and administrability concerns about
transitional elections can be mitigated through the design of the parameters
of the election, these issues may be compelling reasons to be wary of the
use of transitional elections. Accordingly, transitional elections should only
be used in limited circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper is neither to advocate for a consistent policy
of using transitional elections for every change in the tax law nor to argue
for a significant increase in the use of transitional elections. Rather, this
paper merely seeks to draw attention to the phenomenon of explicitlygranted taxpayer choice in legal transitions, to explain when and why such
choice may be granted in the tax law, and to suggest that transitional
elections may be useful in selected situations on a case-by-case basis.
Although some scholars support a case-by-case approach to tax
transitions, 164 others advocate for the adoption of a transition policy that
would be generally applicable to most changes in the tax law. 165 Even the
latter acknowledge, however, that occasional deviations from a widely
accepted transition policy might be appropriate in certain situations. 166 As a
result, transitional elections may be relevant even if a relatively uniform tax
transition policy is adopted. 167 Moreover, since Congress has yet to adopt a
widely applicable approach to tax transition issues, the current approach to
tax changes generally appears to be a case-by-case method. Absent a precommitment to a uniform tax transition policy and given our political
164

See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 44, at 1684 (suggesting that it may be useful to retain

some flexibility in the manner and extent to which transition losses are compensated).
165 See, e.g., SHAViRO, supra note 2, at 98-110 (articulating norms for tax law
transitions); Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 5, at 560; Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra
note 32, at 1157-59, 1174 (advocating a policy of precommitment to transition relief in order
to reduce the costs of lobbying and the opportunities for rent extraction); Logue, supra note
34, at 1131-32, 1138-39 (advocating precommitment to transition relief in order to reduce
the total cost of incentive subsidies); cf Doran, supra note 4, at 597 (expressing
"agnosticism about whether the better approach would be a defined tax transition policy or a
case-by-case resolution of transition issues as they arise in connection with particular
substantive policy changes.").
166 See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 42, at 280.
167 Note, however, that the use of transitional elections as exceptions to a generally
uniform approach to tax transition policy may reduce the willingness of taxpayers to trust
congressional precommitment to the articulated transition policy, which could reduce the
efficacy of such a policy.
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reality where tax legislation is frequently achieved through compromise,
elections may be a useful alternative approach to tax transitions in those
situations where the benefits of transitional elections outweigh the
detriments.
The case for using transitional elections may be most persuasive in
situations where, as in the transitional elections described in Part III, there
is significant uncertainty about whether individual taxpayers will prefer to
be subject to the old or new law during a transition period. 168 In these
situations, transitional elections may provide a tool for balancing taxpayers'
reliance interests with the desire to accelerate the implementation of
socially valuable policy changes, 169 even if only a small number of vocal
taxpayers actively lobbied their legislators for a particular approach to the
transition. 170 Further, it is in these situations where allowing some
individual choice in the transition from the old law to the new one may
provide neutrality-enhancing flexibility for taxpayers affected by the change
in the law. 17 1 Moreover, where there is uncertainty about taxpayer
168 However, if the uncertainty about taxpayer preferences regarding the law change is a
result of a poorly designed law, it generally would be better to fix the law than to provide a
transitional election. The transitional election available in connection with the change to
section 355's ACTB requirement may be an example of this. See supra Part III.A.2
(discussing this election). If the new ACTB test (the affiliated group rule) had not replaced
the old holding company rule, but rather had been added as an alternative way in which
transactions could meet the ACTB requirement, then there would have been no uncertainty
about whether taxpayers seeking nonrecognition treatment would prefer the old test or the
new one. All such taxpayers would prefer the new rule, although some taxpayers who
structured their transactions to be taxable under the old rule might not want the new one to
apply. This approach, which would still have accomplished the policy objectives behind the
active trade or business requirement, would have largely eliminated uncertainty about
taxpayer preferences regarding the rule change. See Willens, supra note 72, at 3-4. Thus, the
public choice concerns would be mitigated, there would be little need to worry about
whether reliance interests needed protection, and the value of, and need for, the transitional
election would be minimized.
169 One example of this is the election that enables taxpayers to opt out of retroactive
application of the new law regarding the tax treatment of gains from the sale of a principal
residence. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing this election). The generally applicable
retroactive effective date of the new law accelerates the implementation of the presumably
socially valuable law change, but the election protects the reliance interests of those
taxpayers who sold their homes before the old law was changed.
170 Of course, this compromise does little to help taxpayers who are ineligible to make
the election. In fact, the compromise likely makes those taxpayers worse off than they would
have been without the availability of the election. This is the case because the transitional
election allows a greater reduction in the tax burden for all taxpayers directly affected by the
law change, thereby reducing revenue to the fisc. See supra Part IV.D.
171 Examples of this include the elections into or out of grandfather protection in
connection with the change in law regarding the tax treatment of gains from the sale of a
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preferences regarding the law change, transitional elections can provide the
Service with useful information about taxpayer preferences and can help the
Service target its enforcement efforts. 172 Thus, in these situations, the
advantages of using a transitional election may outweigh the possible
adverse consequences.
Compare the situation where there is uncertainty about which directlyaffected taxpayers are harmed by the law change to the oft-discussed
possibility of eliminating the exclusion from income for interest paid on
municipal bonds. In the latter situation, rational taxpayers holding the bonds
would, with a high degree of uniformity, want to retain the tax preference
for as long as possible. In that case, a transitional election would be either a
huge administrative hassle, if each taxpayer had to affirmatively elect in
order to get the benefit of whatever transition relief was available, or
basically irrelevant, if transition relief applied unless taxpayers
affirmatively elected to accelerate the elimination of the preference, which
few rational taxpayers would do. 173 As a result, the only likely noteworthy
consequences of using a transitional election in that context are the addition
of complexity to the tax law and the reduction in revenue collected by the
government. In such a case, legislators should just select a congressionally
mandated approach to the transition instead of using a transitional election.
Thus, where taxpayers are expected to have virtually uniform
preferences about the application of the old or new law during a transition
period, transitional elections should be used sparingly, if at all. However,
where taxpayers who are directly affected by the law change are likely to
have different preferences about the application of the old versus the new
law during the transition period, transitional elections may help the Service
learn valuable information about those preferences, may increase the
neutrality of the tax law, and may facilitate compromises. This is
particularly true where there is reason to believe either that both reliance
principal residence and the change in law regarding the amendment of section 355's ACTB
requirement. See supra Part III.A. Taxpayers aware of the possibility of the upcoming
change in law may have otherwise accelerated or decelerated their transactions for only tax
reasons, possibly selecting timing that is not optimal for non-tax business purposes.
172 One example of this is the election available in connection with the retroactive
application of section 197, allowing for the amortization of intangibles. See supra Part
III.B.1.
173 Even envisioning a transitional election in this case as a compromise
between
taxpayers holding the municipal bonds, who may have relied on the tax preference and who
want it to apply as long as possible, and other taxpayers, who may have anticipated the
repeal of the tax preference and/or who may just want this base-broadening change to be
effective as soon as possible, the election would accomplish basically nothing. This is
because rational holders of municipal bonds generally would not opt to accelerate the repeal
of the preference.
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and anticipation should be protected, or that the imperfect legislative
process may result in the use of a transition policy that favors a small,
concentrated, vocal group at the expense of a large, diffuse, quiet group.
Ultimately, by understanding when transitional elections are used in the
tax law and by appreciating the policy implications of their use,
policymakers can balance the benefits and detriments of using elections as
part of transition policy. Thus, policymakers can make informed decisions
about if and when taxpayers should be empowered to make individual
choices about the implementation of changes in the tax law.

